A recent decision from the Court of Appeals of Virginia has clarified that courts cannot annul a marriage after one spouse dies if the marriage was merely voidable due to alleged mental incapacity, rather than void from the outset. This ruling addresses legal questions about posthumous challenges to marriages and could affect how families approach similar disputes in the future.
The complaint was filed by Virginia W. Bozarth, acting as administrator for the estate of her sister, Carol Wood Lantz, in Chesterfield County Circuit Court against Billy Gene Shelton, Sr., following Lantz’s death in 2024.
According to court documents, Lantz was diagnosed with senile dementia in 2018. In 2021, Bozarth moved in with her sister and became her full-time caregiver. During this period, Shelton—a long-time family friend—frequently assisted Lantz with errands due to her inability to drive. In January 2023, Lantz and Shelton were married during an outing; Shelton informed Bozarth of the marriage the next day. Bozarth observed discrepancies on the marriage license, including misspelled parental names and incorrect marital status information.
After Lantz’s health declined and she entered hospice care, she passed away in 2024. Bozarth then qualified as administrator of her estate and initiated legal action seeking to annul the marriage between Lantz and Shelton. Bozarth argued that at the time of the ceremony, Lantz lacked sufficient mental capacity to consent to marriage.
The circuit court requested supplemental briefing from Bozarth regarding her standing as estate administrator to bring such an action. Despite submitting additional arguments asserting her right to proceed, Bozarth faced further questioning from the court about its authority—or subject matter jurisdiction—to annul a marriage after one party’s death. She maintained that because Lantz was mentally incapacitated at the time of marriage, “the marriage was void by operation of law at that moment” and thus subject to judicial nullification even after death.
Shelton did not participate in any proceedings or submit argument before either court. Nonetheless, as noted in Judge Daniel E. Ortiz’s published opinion issued April 21, 2026: “we still recite the facts in the light most favorable to Shelton as the prevailing party below.” The appellate panel included Chief Judge Decker and Judges Ortiz and Callins.
Upon review, both trial and appellate courts concluded that marriages involving a party lacking mental capacity are considered “voidable,” not “void ab initio” (void from inception), under Code § 20-45.1(B). As stated: “marriages involving a party who is mentally incapable of consenting are voidable, not void ab initio.” The statute provides such marriages are “void from the time they shall be so declared by a decree of divorce or nullity.”
The appellate opinion emphasized longstanding precedent: “Nearly a century ago…the Supreme Court interpreted a predecessor statute…which declared marriages involving an ‘insane’ party to ‘be void from the time they shall be so declared by a decree.’…The Court held that the statute rendered such marriages ‘voidable and not void.'”
Because no decree had been issued during Lantz’s lifetime declaring her marriage invalid due to incapacity—and because she had died—the courts determined there was no longer any marital status left for them to adjudicate. As explained: “A spouse’s death…fully determines the marital status and therefore leaves nothing for courts to adjudicate.” Thus, only truly void marriages—such as those deemed bigamous or incestuous under different statutes—can be challenged after one spouse’s death.
Bozarth also raised arguments about errors on paperwork and lack of proper solemnization due to incapacity but these were found insufficient under current statutory interpretation: “Here, Bozarth does not dispute that a marriage ceremony occurred or that Lantz expressed her consent…This ground…would not render the marriage void ab initio: under plain language…is merely voidable.”
Ultimately, both lower court dismissal and appellate affirmation rested on lack of subject matter jurisdiction following Lantz’s passing: “Upon Lantz’s death, her marriage…ended, extinguishing circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction to dissolve it.” The appellate panel affirmed without addressing additional issues related to standing since their decision rested solely on jurisdictional grounds.
Attorneys representing appellant Virginia W. Bozarth included Spencer C. Patterson and W. Joseph Owen III of Owen & Owens PLC; no counsel appeared for appellee Billy Gene Shelton Sr. The case was heard before Judges Ortiz (authoring opinion), Decker (Chief Judge), and Callins under Record No. 0061-25-2.
Source: 0061252_Bozarth_v_Shelton_Jr_Opinion_Virginia_Court_of_Appeals.pdf